This paper explores the market response to two apparently similar but in fact very different firm-specific bad-news events: 1) filing a strategic Chapter 11, and 2) filing a financiallymotivated Chapter 11. We find that the market is unable to distinguish between the two in both the pre-event, and bankruptcy filing event, periods. In particular, in both cases, prices drop by around a half in risk-adjusted terms in the one-year pre-event window, falling a further 25% around the event date. On the other hand, we find that the subsequent market reaction to the announcement of strategic and non-strategic Chapter 11s is quite different. For non-strategic bankruptcies, there is a post-event drift of around -29% over the subsequent 12-months.
Introduction
There is increasing evidence that the market responds differently to bad and good news firm-specific public events (e.g., Womack, 1996; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Chan, 2003 and Tan, 2009 ). However, to our knowledge, no study has yet fully addressed the related but more subtle question: to what extent is the market able to distinguish between apparently similar firm-specific bad news public domain events that have quite distinct underlying motivations? We address this question by re-examining how the market reacts to the announcement of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the most extreme case of a firm-specific bad news event. In particular, we start by recognizing that firms may file for bankruptcy for both strategic and non-strategic reasons. Solvent firms addressing the bankruptcy court not as a last resort but as a planned business strategy typify a strategic bankruptcy. A strategic Chapter 11 typically involves a firm that is not in financial distress but uses the leverage granted by bankruptcy law to break what it views to be onerous labor contracts (e.g., Continental Airlines) or pension responsibilities (e.g., LTV), shirk asbestos-related or other liabilities (e.g., Manville), or seeks to undermine a legal action instigated by commercial rival (e.g., Texaco). In sharp contrast, the more traditional non-strategic bankruptcy is filed by firms in financial collapse. Considering these two types of bankruptcy separately provides a unique context within which to explore our research question. In fact, superficially, strategic and non-strategic Chapter 11s are seemingly alike since they share exactly the same legal setting. However, their underlying motivations are very different, something that according to the traditional paradigm in finance should be recognized by the market and priced appropriately.
Our results can be summarized around two main ideas. First, we find that the market appears unable to differentiate between strategic and non-strategic Chapter 11s prior to, and at the bankruptcy announcement date. In particular, firms filing both strategic and non-strategic -4 -bankruptcies experience virtually identical negative risk-adjusted returns of over 50% during the 12-month pre-event period, and a further similar risk-adjusted drop in prices of around -25% over the three-day period centered on the bankruptcy announcement date.
Second, the different motivations for filing for Chapter 11 prompt an asymmetric longerterm market reaction to this event. In the case of non-strategic Chapter 11s, we find a negative and statistically significant post-event drift of -29% lasting for at least one full year after the announcement date. Conversely, in the case of strategic bankruptcies, the subsequent stock return pattern reverses. The post-Chapter 11 risk-adjusted abnormal returns are around +29%, and statistically significant at conventional levels, over the following 6-month period.
We make two main contributions to the literature. First, we present original evidence on what happens to stock prices in the longer term for firms filing for both strategic and nonstrategic Chapter 11s. Accordingly, we complement previous research by Rose-Green and Dawkins (2002) , who examine only the pre-Chapter 11, and Chapter 11 filing period market reaction conditional on the motivation for the filing.
Second, we add to the literature by finding that, in our case, the market takes time to digest both negative and "positive" bad news events and their implications for firm value: there is a strong post-event drift after the announcement of strategic and non-strategic Chapter 11 filings but in opposite directions. As such, we complement the previous research demonstrating that the market underreacts to negative disclosures (e.g., Michaely, Thaler and Womack, 1995; Womack, 1996; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Chan, 2003; Taffler, Lu and Kausar, 2004; Kausar et al, 2009 ). More importantly, we are the first to show that the market can actually overreact to "positive" bad news events.
At a more general level, our findings also allow us to contribute to the literature relating information uncertainty with the pricing of publicly traded securities. Hirshleifer (2001) , Jiang, Lee and Zhang (2005) , and Zhang (2006) , among others, claim that behavioral biases are more likely to affect investors" decisions in high-information uncertainty settings which, in turn, should lead to mispricing being concentrated in firms with high degrees of information uncertainty. We provide empirical evidence that is consistent with such argument.
-5 -The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains why filing strategic and non-strategic Chapter 11s are, in fact, different events. Section 3 presents our sample, and explains the method we implement to distinguish between strategic and non-strategic bankruptcies. Section 4 examines the key differences between these two types of bankruptcy. Section 5 explores to what extent the market distinguishes between strategic and non-strategic bankruptcies. Section 6 discusses our results, and section 7 concludes.
Two different types of bankruptcy
Historically, bankruptcy has been associated with organizational demise and the destruction of shareholder value (e.g., Johnson, Baliga and Blair, 1986; Sirower, 1991) , with the affected firm having to face both direct and indirect bankruptcy costs (e.g., Altman, 1984; Bris, Welch and Zhu, 2006) . Appendix 1 summarizes the case of the Manhattan Bagel Company, a publicly traded firm forced to file for Chapter 11 in November 1997. This illustrates what occurs during conventional Chapter 11 proceedings.
The traditional position, however, has been disputed in recent years, with an increasing number of scholars claiming that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 fueled a major shift in the market"s perception about bankruptcy (Sheppard, 1995; Tavakolian 1995; Delaney, 1998:3) .
The key issue here is that the Code does not require a company to be insolvent before filing for reorganization under Chapter 11 (e.g., Johnson et al, 1986; Sheppard, 1995; Tavakolian 1995; Altman and Hotchkiss, 2005:28) .
1 As a result, U.S. bankruptcy law offered managers a mechanism that allows their organizations, almost at will, to fight nearly every undesirable financial obligation (Sheppard, 1995) . Not surprisingly, there have been many cases where firms use Chapter 11 in a non-traditional way (Johnson et al, 1986; Delaney, 1998) . The term strategic bankruptcy is sometimes used in the literature to describe such situations, which are 1 A new Bankruptcy Code was introduced in the U.S. on October 2005. According to Altman and Hotchkiss (2005) , the new Code is more "creditor-friendly" than its predecessor and thus filing a strategic bankruptcy might be harder nowadays. However, we only consider the Oct/1979 -Oct/2005 period, so our results are not affected by the potential impact of this regulatory change.
-6 -characterized by solvent companies addressing the bankruptcy Courts not as a last resort but as a planned business strategy (e.g., Sheppard, 1995; Delaney, 1998; Rose-Green and Dawkins, 2002 (Delaney, 1998:145) . Over the years, other firms have filed strategic bankruptcies to break labor contracts (e.g., Continental Airlines), resolve massive numbers of individual claims (e.g., Manville and A.H. Robins), avoid coping with pension funds" financial responsibilities (e.g., LTV), shirk paying unprofitable leases (e.g., HRT Industries), and even dealing with problems with the tax authorities (e.g., Whiting Pools). Another example, that of FederalMogul Corp., which filed for Court protection in October 2001 in an attempt to deal with asbestos-related claims, is provided in appendix 2.
Overall, the above paragraphs indicate that firms filing a strategic Chapter 11 are, at their core, very distinct from the typical company seeking protection from the Federal Bankruptcy Court. Hence, strategic and non-strategic bankruptcies are two a priori similar negative public events in the sense that they share a common legal format. However, it is clear that strategic and non-strategic bankruptcies have completely distinct underlying motivations. The rest of -7 -this paper tests to what extent the market is able to discriminate between these apparently similar, but actually quite distinct, negative firm-specific bad-news events.
Sample selection

Data
Our data consists of the 351 non-finance, non-utility industry firms which file for Chapter In the next step, the 1,556 firms delisted prior to or at their bankruptcy filing date are deleted. From the 470 surviving cases, the 58 firms for which accounting data is not available on COMPUSTAT for a 2-year period before the bankruptcy announcement year are then removed, together with 11 firms incorporated outside the U.S. (as defined by COMPUSTAT).
Penultimately, following prior research, we also remove all 40 financial and utility firms from our final sample. 6 The 10 firms filing for Chapter 7 are then finally excluded in the last step of the screening process. 7 In the end, we identify 351 bankruptcy cases that are suitable to conduct our analysis.
Separating strategic from non-strategic bankruptcies
Next, we use a modified version of Sheppard"s (1995) classification schedule to disentangle strategic from non-strategic Chapter 11s. In particular, a strategic bankruptcy case complies cumulatively with the following list of characteristics:
1. The firm files for Chapter 11 against one identifiable stakeholder-group (e.g., competitors, employees, retirees);
-9 -2. Filing for Chapter 11 helps the firm achieve a specific goal that harms the interests of the stakeholders identified in the previous point (e.g., break labor contracts, avoid a lawsuit, reduce/eliminate pension responsibilities);
3. The filing must not be motivated by a clear short-term financial problem.
The key assumption underlying our classification schedule is that firms may file for Chapter We implement a 3-stage process to classify all our sample firms as either strategic or nonstrategic bankruptcy cases. We start by using Factiva"s keyword-search tool to collect news articles for all our sample firms in the one-year period before their Chapter 11 date and use that information to recreate each bankruptcy story. In particular, we try to identify a specific stakeholder-group against which management files the Chapter 11 and how such action benefits the firm. We then look for signs indicating that the firm is in financial distress. This is done by searching the news articles for keywords like "default on bond contract", "bond downgrade", "default on interest payment", "default on bank loan payment", "qualified audit opinion", "modified audit opinion", "trade credit problem", "technical default", "liquidity problem", "private debt workout" and "renegotiation of credit line". Our choice of keywords is based on the extant research showing that the likelihood of bankruptcy is directly related with the occurrence of other (negative) public events. For instance, Beneish and Press (1995) find that firms in technical default are more likely to go bankrupt. They also show that the probability of bankruptcy increases after a debt service default. Campbell and Mutchler (1988) ,
-10 - Chen and Church (1996), and Holder-Webb and Wilkins (2000) find that bankruptcy is more likely to occur after the issuance of a going-concern opinion.
In the second step, we complement our initial analysis by screening the information Only two other studies attempt to separate strategic from non-strategic Chapter 11s. In particular, Sheppard (1995) works with a total of 155 firms filing for Chapter 11 between October, 1979, and December, 1987 , classifying 55 of these firms as strategic bankruptcies (approximately 35% of his total sample). The second study, by Rose-Green and Dawkins (2002) , identifies 245 firms filing for Chapter 11 between 1980 and 1997. A total of 19 firms are classified by the authors as strategic bankruptcy cases (around 8% of the total sample). Importantly, in sharp contrast to our research, neither of these papers requires firms to continue trading after their Chapter 11 filing date. common reasons for taking this course of action are to "Fight a court imposed award to a competitor" and "Break labor contracts", which combined account for a further 25% of the strategic cases.
Panel C of table 2 shows the distribution of strategic and non-strategic bankruptcies by year.
The maximum number of non-strategic (strategic) bankruptcies occurring in any given year is 41 (3), around 12.9% (9.3%) of the total number of cases. In untabulated results, we check for potential problems relating to industry clustering. We do not find any particular cause for concern as our 351 sample firms have 53 different 2-digit SIC codes, which correspond to 168 different 4-digit SIC codes.
Strategic and non-strategic bankruptcies: are there any differences?
We start analyzing potential differences between strategic and non-strategic bankruptcies with the help of table 3. Panel A summarizes key accounting variables. As can be seen, the typical firm filing a strategic Chapter 11 is larger than its non-strategic counterpart. Mean (median) total assets for the strategic cases are $2,570m ($191m), whereas for the non-strategic set, mean (median) total assets are $454m ($80m). The t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test)
for difference in means (medians) is statistically significant at the 10% level (1% level). Panel
A of table 3 also shows that firms filing a strategic bankruptcy are in a better financial position than firms filing a non-strategic bankruptcy: mean and median turnover, and return on assets are higher, and mean and median leverage are lower. In addition, mean (median) z-score for the strategic group is 2.30 (2.19), while its equivalent for the non-strategic set is 1.28 (1.25). The ttest (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) for difference in mean (median) z-score is significant at the 5% level (5% level). Altman (1968) establishes a z-score cut-off point of 1.81 to separate between firms that clearly fall into the bankruptcy category from all other firms. Consequently, 9 Asbestos-related cases account for a large majority of these strategic Chapter 11s.
-12 -our results suggest that firms filing a strategic Chapter 11 (non-strategic Chapter 11) are not (are) in imminent danger of failure on this basis.
Panel B of table 3 summarizes some key market-related variables. We find that, in the preevent period, the typical firm filing for a strategic bankruptcy trades around 243 days (out of 252), increasing to 251 days in the post-announcement period (median number of trading days remains stable around 251 days in these two periods). Accordingly, it seems that the stock of these firms is of interest to a certain clientele, both before and after the bankruptcy announcement date. Results are not very different for the non-strategic cases. Here, the typical firm is traded on an average of 251 days in the pre-event period, and 228 in the post-event period (respective median values are 228, and 244), again suggesting the existence of a specific investor clientele. Table 3 , panel B also shows that the mean (median) stock price of the typical strategic bankruptcy is higher than its non-strategic equivalent, a phenomenon that holds in both the pre-and post-event period. Despite these differences, both types of bankruptcy share some characteristics. For instance, the mean 11-month pre-event raw returns do not differ significantly. Furthermore, both sets of firms have a similar book-to-market ratio.
Panel C of table 3 summarizes other relevant information about these two sets of bankrupt firms. The data again suggests that firms filing a strategic bankruptcy are in a better financial position than the other bankrupt firms. For example, almost 40% (50%) of the former have positive earnings (are paying dividends) before the Chapter 11 filing, a figure considerably higher than the 24% (24%) obtained for the latter. Moreover, only 31% of firms filing a strategic Chapter 11 are delisted in the 12-month period after their bankruptcy date, compared with 58% for the non-strategic set. degree of information uncertainty affecting a particular security, and its relative mispricing. As such, we need to explore to what extent information about firms filing both strategic and nonstrategic bankruptcies flows equally to the market; marked differences in the information environment surrounding these firms may well explain different market reactions to the two bad news events under analysis.
As can be seen, in the pre-event period, we are unable to find a clear difference in the information environment surrounding our two types of firms. For instance, firms filing a strategic Chapter 11 are larger than their non-strategic counterparts with mean (median) market capitalization one month before the bankruptcy filing date of $501m ($86m) compared with $126m ($31m). In principle, this would mean that firms filing the former type of bankruptcy are less exposed to information uncertainty problems since the level of firm-specific information tends to increase, ceteris paribus, with firm size (e.g., Jiang et al, 2005; Zhang, 2006 , Kumar, 2009 ). However, earnings volatility is significantly greater for firms filing a strategic bankruptcy; as such, these firms should, everything else being equal, be exposed to more information uncertainty (Kumar, 2009 ). On the other hand, firm age does not differ, nor does trading volume at the 5% level. Also, we are not able to find any statistically significant differences in subgroup means for cash flow volatility, idiosyncratic share price volatility, and media coverage, although medians do differ at conventional levels demonstrating the skewed distribution of these variables. Nonetheless, our data does unambiguously show that in the preevent period, firms filing a strategic bankruptcy have significantly higher analyst coverage, and institutional ownership, and significantly lower trading costs.
Results for the post-event period are much clearer. Analysts, and median media coverage are significantly higher for the strategic set, while idiosyncratic volatility is significantly lower.
Also, again, we find that transaction costs are smaller for firms filing a strategic Chapter 11.
Moreover, in untabulated results, we find that 189 firms (59.2% of the total) filing a nonstrategic Chapter 11 are not covered by a single analyst post-event. The corresponding number for firms filing a strategic bankruptcy is significantly lower: 11 (34.3% of total). We also find -14 -that, after filing for bankruptcy, 105 of firms (33.3% of total) filing a non-strategic Chapter 11 stop reporting their quarterly accounts with the SEC. Only one firm filing a strategic Chapter 11 similarly does so. In short, our analysis clearly indicates that, in the post-bankruptcy period, the level of information uncertainty is appreciably higher for firms filing a conventional Chapter 11.
Can the market tell the difference between strategic and non-strategic Chapter 11s?
The previous section suggests the existence of some marked differences between firms filing a strategic and a non-strategic Chapter 11. In this section we adopt an event-study approach to investigate to what extent such differences are priced appropriately by the stock market.
Measuring abnormal returns
We use a buy-and-hold strategy to make inferences about our sample firms" stock return pattern before, during and after their Chapter 11 filing date. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) show that the statistical problems with BHARs usually arise over the 3-to 5-year time horizon whereas we restrict our analysis to a one-year period. This is for two reasons. First, filing for bankruptcy often leads to firm delisting, and thus extending the period for computing abnormal returns is problematic due to the loss of many sample cases (Morse and Shaw, 1988) . Second, firms usually start emerging from bankruptcy 15 months after their Chapter 11 filing date (Kalay, Singhal and Tashjian, 2007) , and thus ending the abnormal return calculation period three months before minimizes the impact of this important event on our results. 10 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are computed as follows:
10 Our typical sample firm spends an average (median) of 24.4 (18.1) months in bankruptcy. This is consistent with previous research by Eberhart, Altman and Aggarwal (1999 Er is the expected return for firm i at time t . Individual BHARs are averaged cross-sectionaly as follows (Barber and Lyon, 1997) :  to 2  . Subscript j indicates the type of bankruptcy for which we are computing the mean abnormal returns (i.e., strategic or a non-strategic Chapter 11s).
As suggested by equation (2), we use equally weighted rather than value-weighted returns since this is more appropriate in our context; giving the same weight to all firms in the investment portfolio allows maximum diversification of each firm"s idiosyncratic risk, a critical aspect when dealing with failed firms (e.g., Gilson, 1995; Platt, 1999:110) . Additionally, previous research shows that equal weighting captures the extent of underperformance better than value weighting does given the particular nature of our bankrupt firms (Brav, Geczy and Gompers, 2000; Kadiyala and Rau, 2004) .
Unless otherwise stated, daily returns collected from CRSP are employed in the calculation of abnormal returns.
11 As argued by Kothari and Warner (2007) , the use of daily rather than monthly security returns data permits more precise measurement of abnormal returns, and more informative studies of announcement effects. We define a year as twelve 21-trading day intervals, an approach consistent with previous research (Michaely, Thaler and Womack, 1995) . Event day 1 t  is included in the bankruptcy announcement window together with days 1 t  , and 0 t  , the bankruptcy announcement date, as firms are able to file their bankruptcy petition after the market closes (Dawkins, Bhattacharya and Bamber, 2007 ).
-16 -Some of our sample firms are delisted in the 12-month period subsequent to their Chapter 11 filing date.
12 Drawing on Shumway (1997) , and Shumway and Warther (1999) , we include the delisting return in the calculation of abnormal returns. Barber and Lyon (1997) , and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) point out that the sample"s mean long-run abnormal return calculated with truncation does not represent the average return an investor could earn from investing in an executable strategy, since his use of the proceeds from the investment in a delisted firm is left unresolved. Kausar et al (2009) emphasize that this is a crucial issue when dealing with highly distressed firms, and show that considering a zero abnormal return in the post-delisting period is a reasonable way to deal with it. We draw directly on their empirical findings and assume that, in the post-delisting period, sample firms earn a zero abnormal return. 
Benchmark procedure
Following Barber and Lyon (1997) , and Ang and Zhang (2004) , we use a single control firm approach to generate our results. We identify a control firm by matching each of our sample firms with the firm with most similar size and book-to-market ratio. This approach is consistent with a number of recent studies exploring the longer-term return pattern of highly financially distressed firms (e.g., Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Taffler et al, 2004; Kausar et al, 2009 ).
First, for each sample firm, market capitalization is measured one month before the bankruptcy filing date. 14 CRSP is then searched for an initial pool of matching candidates with market capitalization at the end of the bankruptcy filing month of 70% to 130% of the sample firm"s equity value. The control firm is then identified as that firm within this set with the closest book-to-market ratio. To ensure the numerator is available when market value is derived, we use the book value of equity taken from the last annual accounts reported before the bankruptcy 12 Performance issues explain 94% of these delisting cases (CRSP delisting codes 500 to 599). 13 Re-investing the proceeds from the delisting payment in a portfolio of stocks comprising the same size decile of the delisted firm or in the CRSP value-weighted index for the remainder of the compounding period, however, does not alter our results in any meaningful way. 14 This helps reduce the impact of the event on the leading matching variable. As a robustness check, we measure size for all sample firms two, three, six and 12 months before their bankruptcy date and re-run the analysis. Results remain qualitatively unchanged.
-17 -year (Fama and French, 1992) , and allow a 3-month lag to measure the market value of equity. 15 The match is confirmed if: 1) the control firm has at least 24 pre-event months of returns available on CRSP; 2) is not in bankruptcy; 3) is incorporated in the US; 4) is not a financial or utility firm, and 5) it has sufficient information on COMPUSTAT to conduct our analysis.
Importantly, if a control firm is delisted before the ending date for its corresponding bankrupt firm period, a second firm is spliced in after its delisting date, that with second closest size and book-to-market to that of the delisted firm in the original ranking. Finally, if a chosen control firm itself subsequently files for bankruptcy, we treat it as if it is delisted on its bankruptcy date. These procedures introduce no survivorship or look-ahead bias and minimize the number of transactions implicit in the calculations (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995) .
Abnormal return statistical significance
Following Barber and Lyon (1997) , and Ang and Zhang (2004) , we employ a t-test to infer the statistical significance of the different mean BHARs. Importantly, we use the cross-section of the buy-and-hold abnormal returns to form an estimator of their variance, which allows it to change after the event (Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen, 1991) . This is appropriate since previous research by Aharony, Jones and Swary (1980) , and later confirmed by Johnson (1989), and McEnally and Todd (1993) , shows that both the systematic and unsystematic risk of bankrupt firms varies as the bankruptcy date approaches.
Equation (1) is used for exploring the market"s longer-term reaction to bankruptcy announcements. However, longer-horizon returns tend to exhibit positive skewness (e.g., Fama, 1998) , which is usually more pronounced in the case of smaller firms (Ball, Kothari and Shanken, 1995) . Drawing on Kraft, Leone and Wasley, (2006), we report mean BHARs that are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels to reduce the impact of extreme outliers in our 15 The market value of every sample firm is measured before its bankruptcy announcement date. This result is confirmed by manually inspecting all cases.
-18 -analysis. Importantly, Kausar et al (2009) show that winsorizing abnormal returns is of crucial importance when dealing with small firms since this method helps in reducing the impact of low-price stocks on the skewness of ex-post returns. The same argument is also put forward by Kraft et al (2006) , and is especially important in the context of our research since a relatively large number of our bankrupt firms trade at prices below $1 per share.
We also present median returns to check the validity of our parametric results. These returns are unaffected by extreme observations, and present some theoretical advantages over mean
BHARs (Ang and Zhang, 2004 As mentioned in section 5.1, we compute abnormal returns for strategic and non-strategic bankruptcies separately. We use t-tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests) to investigate if there is a difference in mean (median) performance of the two sub-samples. Table 4 summarizes our main results. Panel A shows that in the pre-event period, and for both sub-samples, mean and median BHARs are negative, and statistically significant at better than the 1% level. In particular, for the 12-month pre-event window mean (median) BHARs for the non-strategic Chapter 11s, and strategic Chapter 11s are -52% (-44%), and -55% (-44%) respectively, and -44% (-42%), and -41% (-40%) for the 6-month pre-announcement period.
Main results
- Kothari and Warner, 2007) ; 2) this earlier study uses market-adjusted returns, an approach that is highly problematic when dealing with longer-term event studies (e.g., Barber
and Lyon, 1997), and 3) Rose-Green and Dawkins (2002) use New Generation Research Inc., a standardized database, to identify their strategic bankruptcy cases, whereas we use a rigorous manual inspection process to achieve the same objective.
Panel B of table 4 shows a strong and negative reaction to both strategic and non-strategic Chapter 11 announcements. In particular, for the strategic set, the mean (median) market reaction in the (-1,+1) window is -25%, significant at the 1% level (-28%, p<0.01). The respective counterpart values for the non-strategic portfolio are -25% (p<0.01) and -27% (p<0. 01). Differences in portfolio mean and median abnormal performance are not significant at conventional levels, a result consistent with that reported by Rose-Green and Dawkins (2002) .
Hence, announcing a strategically or non-strategically motivated Chapter 11 appears to be perceived equally by the market as an extreme firm-specific bad news event.
Panel C of table 4 shows what happens after the bankruptcy announcement date, a period not covered by Rose-Green and Dawkins (2002) . There is clear evidence of an asymmetric market response to Chapter 11 filings conditional on the event"s core motivation. For the nonstrategic portfolio, all post-event BHARs are negative and statistically significant, indicating the existence of a post-bankruptcy announcement drift. Conversely, for the strategic set, there is evidence of a stock price reversal since all medium-term post-event BHARs are positive, although only significant up to 6-months. Importantly, the differences in mean (median) returns for the two sub-samples are all significant, irrespective of the post-event windows we consider.
For illustrative purposes, figure 1 graphs the mean size and book-to-market risk-adjusted
BHARs over a period of 25 months centered on the bankruptcy announcement month for both the strategic and non-strategic sub-sample. 17 In line with table 4, figure 1 shows an asymmetric market reaction to bankruptcy conditional on the underlying motivation of the event. For the non-strategic set, the post-event drift follows a clear pre-event decline in stock returns. On the other hand, there is evidence that filing for strategic Chapter 11 protection prompts a post-event reversal in stock returns.
Robustness tests
As emphasized in the recent survey paper by Kothari and Warner (2007) , there is still much debate surrounding the appropriate measurement of longer-term abnormal returns. A casual examination of the extant literature employing longer-term event studies suggests that the best 17 Monthly returns are calculated following Kausar et al (2009) . To be precise, returns for 25 months centred on the bankruptcy announcement month are collected from CRPS monthly stock return file for both sample (strategic and non-strategic Chapter 11 sets) and control firms. The bankruptcy month is termed as the event month and excluded from the analysis. Equations (1) and (2) are then used to compute the abnormal returns. Figure 1 here Table 4 here -21 -approach to check the soundness of a given result is testing its robustness using a combination of alternative methods (e.g., Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002; Byun and Rozeff, 2003) . In this section, we test for a range of competing explanations for our anomalous results, namely the impact of the momentum effect, distress risk, and industry.
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Panel A of table 3 clearly shows that, for both the strategic and non-strategic portfolios, stock prices fall steeply in the pre-bankruptcy period. As such, it could be possible that our findings are no more than a continuation of such negative returns as with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . To test whether stock momentum is, in fact, driving our results we match each of our bankrupt firms with a new control firm as follows. First, we identify all non-bankrupt, nonfinance, non-utility firms with a market capitalization between 70% and 130% of that of each our sample firm"s market capitalization. Second, from this set, we choose the firm with prior 12-month raw returns closest to that of the sample firm. 19 We then compare post-event 12-month bankrupt and control firm returns.
We find that our main results are unaffected. For non-strategic Chapter 11 firms, mean postevent 12-month (6-month) BHARs are -30% (-22%), and median 12-month (6-month) BHARs -36% (-23%), all significant at better than the 1% (1%) level. For the strategic Chapter 11
cases, equivalent mean 12-month (6-month) BHARs are 23% (p=0.36) (39%; p<0.05), and median 12-month (6-month) BHARs are 27% (p=0.21) (35%; p<0.01). The 12-month (6-month) mean difference in performance between the two sets of firms is significant at the 5% (1%) level, and the 12-month (6-month) median difference at the 1% (1%) level. As such, we cannot explain our results in terms of prior return continuation.
Panel A of table 3 shows that mean (median) z-score for our non-strategic Chapter 11 firms is 1.28 (1.25), and for our strategic Chapter 11s 2.30 (2.19), where z< 1.81 indicates firms 18 We do not attempt to run a calendar time approach as suggested by Fama (1998) because we have only 32 firms filing a strategic bankruptcy. As such, results would not be statistically meaningful. 19 In particular, we compute momentum for both sample and control firms as: R is the raw monthly return of firm i in month t , with 0 t  being the bankruptcy announcement month. All data for computing momentum are taken from CRSP"s monthly stock return file.
-22 -which "clearly fall into the bankruptcy category". On this basis, the majority of our firms filing a non-strategic Chapter 11 are financially distressed when entering into Federal protection. Dichev (1998) suggests that firms with higher distress risk significantly underperform in the following year and, a similar finding is reported by Griffin and Lemmon (2002) . As such, we need to distinguish between a financial distress explanation and a bankruptcy-based explanation for our anomalous results. To do this, we adopt the same approach as for the momentum robustness check and now match our bankrupt firms with control firms based on size and z-score.
Our main results are unaffected. For non-strategic Chapter 11 firms, mean post-event 12-month (6-month) BHARs are now -39% (-21%), with median 12-month (6-month) BHARs -40% (-23%), all significant at better than the 1% (1%) level. In the case of strategic Chapter 11 firms, equivalent mean 12-month (6-month) BHARS are 23% (p=0.25) (39%; p<0.01), with median 12-month (6-month) BHARS 21% (p=0.37) (40%; p<0.01). All the 12-month, and 6-month, mean and median differences in performance between the two sets of firms remain significant at the 1% level suggesting our results are not driven by different levels of ex ante bankruptcy risk.
Industry clustering arises when events are concentrated in a few particular industries. This is problematic because it reduces the power of statistical tests used to verify the significance of abnormal returns (e.g., Mackinlay, 1997) . This issue is important in the context of our research since there is a potential contagion/competitive industry effect when a firm files for bankruptcy (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1992) . Accordingly, and even though our sample is not affected by a significant degree of industry clustering, we still test for the possibility that our results are driven by an industry clustering explanation.
To control for an industry-specific explanation we match each of our bankrupt firms with control firms on industry, size and book-to-market in that order. First, industry is matched using COMPUSTAT"s 2-digit SIC code. The second step is to identify, for each bankrupt firm, all potential control firms that belong to the same industry class and that lie within the sample -23 -firm"s size decile. 20 Finally, the firm with closest book-to-market ratio to that of the sample firm is chosen as the control firm.
After controlling for industry, we find for the non-strategic Chapter 11 portfolio, a mean 12-month (6-month) BHAR of -38% (-21%), and a median 12-month (6-month) BHAR of -36% (-22%), all significant at better than the 1% (1%) level. For the strategic Chapter 11 portfolio, mean 12-month (6-month) BHARs are 26% (p=0.42) (35%; p<0.05), and median 12-month (6-month) BHARs are 21% (p=0.58) (29%; p<0.01). As all differences remain significant at the 1% level, our original results are not an industry-specific phenomenon.
Discussion of results
This paper explores how the stock market reacts to two apparently similar bad news events with markedly distinct underlying motivations: filing a strategic and a non-strategic Chapter 11.
Our tests show that the market does not differentiate between the two before the event date.
One explanation for our findings resides on Tversky and Kahneman"s (1974) representativeness bias. People suffering from this behavioral bias tend to judge the probability of an event by finding a "comparable known" event and assuming that the probabilities will be similar. In our context, this would mean that, in the pre-bankruptcy period, the market recognizes strategic and non-strategic Chapter11s as different parts of the same stereotype, i.e., that of future "loser firm" whose existence as viable going-concerns is at stake. Recall that firms filing a non-strategic Chapter 11 are facing complete financial collapse, a situation that usually develops over several months/years. Hence, the mounting uncertainty about such firms" future prospects explains why investors may treat them as "loser firms" even before the actual filing. In contrast, firms filing a strategic bankruptcy are financially and economically viable, at least in the short-run. However, even these firms have to deal with increased uncertainty, which, in their case, is driven by the unknown impact on shareholder value of the onerous -24 -liability that is ultimately resolved by filing the strategic Chapter 11. This helps clarify why firms entering into a strategic bankruptcy may also be perceived by the market as a "loser firm"
in the pre-event period.
The more interesting findings, however, arise when we examine what happens after the formal announcement of bankruptcy. We document a continuous drop (rise) in the risk-adjusted stock price of firms filing a non-strategic (strategic) Chapter 11, which lasts at least for a full year (six-month period) after the event date. Such asymmetric post-event stock return pattern has two main implications. First, it indicates that the market values differently the two types of bankruptcy we consider: strategic bankruptcies are perceived as good news while non-strategic Chapter 11s are viewed as bad news. Second, it shows that the market underreacts in the case of "negative" bad news events (i.e., prices do not decline as much at the event-date as it would be required by the efficient market hypothesis) and that it actually overreacts in the case of "positive" bad news events (i.e., prices plummet too much in the event-period as compared to what the EMH would predict).
Our analysis offers some clues in how to understand our novel and puzzling post-bankruptcy results. In fact, there is evidence that the information and trading environment is of critical importance in this context. Section 4 shows that information becomes very scarce for companies filing a non-strategic Chapter 11: many of them are delisted from the main exchanges, analysts and popular newspapers cease covering such firms and many of them stop filing their financial statements with the SEC. In addition, panel D of table 3 shows that institutional investors hold, at best, a very marginal percentage of these firms" stock. Hence, post-event, retail investors are likely to be the key stockholders and traders of firms filing a non-strategic Chapter 11. Such market participants are allegedly more prone to behavioral biases and less capable to make rational investment decisions. In addition, the sharp increase in the costs that investors have to face when trading the stock of firms filing a non-strategic
Chapter 11 suggests that sophisticated arbitrageurs are likely to be absent from this market. By combining all of these factors, we can explain why the market price of firms filing a nonstrategic bankruptcy does not converge to its fundamental value even in the longer-run.
-25 -In sharp contrast, firms filing a strategic Chapter 11 enjoy a relatively more favorable information and trading environment: analysts and media actively report on these firms, and stock exchanges seem to allow them to remain listed. In addition, institutional investors continue to hold these firms" stock while the trading costs do not increase dramatic after the bankruptcy announcement. Consequently, information about firms filing a strategic Chapter 11 is likely to be more abundant and flow more promptly across market participants. In addition, at least some of these firms" investors are sophisticated, which puts them in a position to correctly estimate the impact of the bankruptcy filing on firm value. Moreover, smart investors are probably more active in the case of these firms for two main reasons: 1) trading cost are relatively lower than for firms filing a non-strategic bankruptcy, 2) an arbitrage strategy is much easier to implement in the case of firms filing a strategic bankruptcy as it simply entails buying the cheap stock of such firms and wait for the price to increase. Taken together, all these characteristics help explain why, post-event, we observe a reversal in the stock return pattern of firms filing a strategic Chapter 11.
Conclusion
We explore how the market reacts to two apparently similar bad news events with completely distinct underlying motivations: filing strategic and non-strategic Chapter 11s.
Solvent firms addressing the Bankruptcy Court as a planned business strategy characterize the first type of bankruptcy; companies on the verge of imminent financial collapse typify a nonstrategic bankruptcy. We show that the market does not differentiate between these two types of Chapter 11 before, and at, the event date. In particular, prices drop by around half in riskadjusted terms during the one-year pre-event window, and by a further 25% around the eventdate for both sets of firms. On the other hand, we find that the market"s reaction to these two bad news events is contingent on the nature of the filing. For the set of non-strategic bankruptcies, we document a statistically significant downward post-event drift lasting at least one full year after the Chapter 11 date. Conversely, we find that filing a strategic Chapter 11
-26 -prompts a reversal in the stock return pattern -post-event abnormal returns are positive and significant, a phenomenon that lasts at least for the following six months
Our findings thus suggest that the market underreacts to the announcement of non-strategic bankruptcies, while it overreacts to the announcement of strategic bankruptcies. This is clearly inconsistent with the EMH as traditionally expressed, but seems to be explained by a combination of behavioral biases, information uncertainty and trading environment arguments.
-27 - Table 1 Defining the sample This table summarizes the steps undertaken to identify this study"s sample. The first stage is combining seven different data sources to identify an initial set of non-overlapping firms that filed for bankruptcy in the US between 01. 10.1979 and 17.10.2005 . In order to be included in the final sample a given company must comply with the following criteria: 1) have enough data on CRSP and COMPUSTAT to conduct the analysis, 2) be listed and remain listed after the bankruptcy announcement date, trading common stock and 3) be a domestic company, filing for Chapter 11. Additionally, firms that are financial or utility companies are not considered in the final sample. This table presents the distribution of strategic and non-strategic bankruptcies by exchange listing and year. It also summarizes the key reasons for filing a strategic bankruptcy. In the panels below, firms are allocated to the strategic set if: 1) their managers use Chapter 11 against one identifiable stakeholder-group; 2) filing for Chapter 11 helps managers achieve a specific goal that harms the interests of the stakeholders identified in the previous point; 3) the filing is not motivated by a clear short-term financial problem. All remaining firms are allocated to the non-strategic set. 01.10.1979 and 17.10.2005 and that remained listed on a major US stock exchange after their bankruptcy date. In the panels below, firms are allocated to the strategic portfolio if filing a strategic bankruptcy (n=32). Firms included in this portfolio respect the following conditions: 1) their managers use Chapter 11 against one identifiable stakeholdergroup; 2) filing for Chapter 11 helps managers achieve a specific goal that harms the interests of the stakeholders identified in the previous point; 3) the filing is not motivated by a clear short-term financial problem. All remaining firms are allocated to the non-strategic portfolio (n=319 
Variable definition: TA -total assets in millions of dollars CUR -current ratio (current assets/current liabilities) LEV -leverage (total debt/total assets) SALES -turnover in millions of dollars ROA -return on assets (net income/total assets) Z-Score -bankruptcy-risk proxy (Altman, 1968) Note: All variables are computed with data taken from the last annual accounts reported before the bankruptcy year.
-35 - Variable definition:
Pre Tdays -number of days on which trading takes place in the calendar year preceding the bankruptcy announcement month Pos Tdays -number of days on which trading takes place in the calendar year following the bankruptcy announcement month Pre Price -daily average stock price measured for the 12-month pre-bankruptcy period (in dollars) Pos Price -daily average stock price measured in the 12-month post-bankruptcy period (in dollars) B/M -book-to-market ratio Mom -12-month (-12,-1) pre-event average monthly raw returns -auditor quality proxy dummy (1 if "Big Eight", 0 otherwise) Delist -delist dummy (1 if company is delisted within one-calendar year of the bankruptcy date, 0 otherwise) Note: Where applicable, variables are computed with data taken from the last annual accounts reported before the bankruptcy year.
-36 - Variable definition: Age -Number of years since the stock first appeared in the CRSP database Size -market capitalization (price times shares outstanding) one month before the bankruptcy filing date in millions of dollars Earvol -Earnings volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the realized earnings over the previous 20 pre-bankruptcy quarters Cfvol -Cash-flow volatility, measured as the standard deviation of cash-flow from operations over the previous 20 pre-bankruptcy quarters, PreIdvol -pre-event idiosyncratic return volatility, measured as the variance of the residual obtained by fitting a four-factor model to the stock returns time-series. The idiosyncratic volatility for each stock is estimated using data for the one-year prebankruptcy period PosIdvol -pos-event idiosyncratic return volatility, measured as the variance of the residual obtained by fitting a four-factor model to the stock returns time-series. The idiosyncratic volatility for each stock is estimated using data for the one-year post-bankruptcy period Pre Vol -average monthly trading volume measured over the 6-month pre-bankruptcy period preceding Pos Vol -average monthly trading volume measured over the 6-month post-bankruptcy period Pre Tc -trading cost estimate, measured using the Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) LDV for the 12-month pre-event period
-37 -Pos Tc -trading cost estimate, measured using the Lesmond et al (1999) LDV for the 12-month post-event period Pre Anal -analyst coverage, defined as the average number of analysts each month covering the stock during the last 12 pre-bankruptcy months Pos Anal -analyst coverage, defined as the average number of analysts each month covering the stock during the first 12 post-bankruptcy months Pre News -media coverage proxy, defined as the average number of news items per month reported on Factiva for the last 12 pre-bankruptcy months Pos News -media coverage proxy, defined as the average number of news items per month reported on Factiva for the first 12 post-bankruptcy months Pre Inst -institutional ownership proxy measured as average monthly institutional stockholding on the Thomson Institutional 13f file for the most recent 12 prebankruptcy months, Pos Inst -institutional ownership proxy measured as average monthly institutional stockholding on the Thomson Institutional 13f file for the first 12 postbankruptcy months -38 - 01.10.1979 and 17.10.2005 and that remained listed on a major US stock exchange after their bankruptcy date. In the panels below, firms are allocated to the strategic portfolio if filing a strategic bankruptcy (n=32). Firms included in this portfolio respect the following conditions: 1) their managers use Chapter 11 against one identifiable stakeholder-group; 2) filing for Chapter 11 helps managers achieve a specific goal that harms the interests of the stakeholders identified in the previous point; 3) the filing is not motivated by a clear short-term financial problem. All remaining firms are allocated to the non-strategic portfolio (n=319). All compounding periods are defined in trading days, where day zero is the Chapter 11 announcement date. A control firm approach based on size and book-to-market is used to estimate the abnormal returns. Specifically, for each sample firm (filing a strategic or a non-strategic Chapter 11), we identify all CRPS firms with a market capitalization between 70 and 130% of its equity market value. The respective control firm is then selected as that firm with book-to-market closest to that of the sample firm. For the Non-strategic and Strategic columns, the two-tailed significance level from t-statistics (Wilcoxon signed rank-test) is reported below the mean (median). In the last two columns, the two-tailed significance level from t-statistics or a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are reported below the corresponding mean or median difference. 
Pre-and post-abnormal returns for strategic and non-strategic bankruptcies
This figure graphs the mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the 25-month period centred on the bankruptcy announcement month for our population of 351 non-finance, non-utility industry firms, fully listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ that filed for Chapter 11 between 01.10.1979 and 17.10.2005 and that remained listed on a major US stock exchange after their bankruptcy date. Firms are allocated to the strategic portfolio if filing a strategic bankruptcy (n=32). Firms included in this portfolio respect the following conditions: 1) their managers use Chapter 11 against one identifiable stakeholder-group; 2) filing for Chapter 11 helps managers achieve a specific goal that harms the interests of the stakeholders identified in the previous point; 3) the filing is not motivated by a clear short-term financial problem. All remaining firms are allocated to the non-strategic portfolio (n=319). A control firm approach based on size and book-to-market is used to estimate the abnormal returns. Specifically, for each sample company (filing a strategic or a non-strategic Chapter 11), we identify all CRPS firms with a market capitalization between 70 and 130% of its equity market value. The respective control firm is then selected as that firm with book-to-market closest to that of the sample firm. 
